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Abstract 
Since Xi Jinping came to power, new concepts and ideas have come to 
define China’s polity. Of which, Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) is one of 
the significant concepts added to China’s national strategy with the aim 
to integrate the civilian research and commercial sectors with the military 
and defence industrial base. The MCF is integral to Xi’s vision of China 
Dream of building a strong country with a strong military by enabling the 
Military to harness the country’s rapid economic growth. Here, the quest 
lies in building capabilities in ‘dual-use’ technology and infrastructure 
to enhance China’s overall economic and military capability and secure 
China’s position vis-à-vis the West. The challenge for China is to match 
the speed and scope of the rapid technological pace to create fast or lose 
the ability to compete. In this context, the paper seeks to understand the 
civil-military integration in China, under its current form as ‘MCF’. The 
key elements examined are the objectives, goals and policies of the MCF 
strategy. It also explores the significance as well as the scepticism attached to 
China’s MCF strategy.
Dr. Amrita Jash is Research Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
























What America terms as ‘Civil-Military Integration’ (CMI), the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) under the command of President Xi Jinping has 
named it “Military-Civil Fusion” (MCF, 军民融合). In general, CMI in 
the United States represents cooperation between the government and 
the private bodies in research and development; PRC’s MCF is ‘state-led, 
state-directed programme to leverage all levers of state and commercial 
power’ to strengthen the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) armed 
wing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
What is noteworthy is that unlike the West, China has no single 
term to denote CMI; as witnessed in the way the use and terminology of 
CMI has evolved under different leadership. For instance, CMI has been 
interchangeably used with terms such as: “military and civilian dual use” 
(军民两用), “military-civilian integration” (MCI, 军民结), combining 
peacetime and wartime preparations (平战结合), “nestling the military 
within the civilian” (寓军于民]), “military-civilian fusion-style develop 
path” (军民融合式发展路子), among others.1 Here, it is important to 
note that the language China uses to frame its plans itself becomes a point 
of query. 
While CMI has been phrased differently in the Chinese context, but 
the essence has remained the same. That is, the aim is to achieve a state 
of “deep fusion” through the integration of the two essential building 
blocks: the military, and the civil. Here, ‘military’ includes every aspect of 
the national defence and force building endeavour; while ‘civil’ refers to 
fields in the economic and social system that are closely related to national 
defence and force-building.2 The other key observable difference is that 
unlike the West, China puts ‘military’ before the ‘civil’; this very priority 
of order calls for significant ‘watch’ to understand—What are China’s 
intentions? 
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Xi Jinping’s Quest for Reforms in CMI
In November 2013, at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee 
of the CPC, Xi Jinping called for “deepening national defence and military 
reform”. As the Communiqué emphasised on the: 
“objective of building a line of strong armies for this Party under new 
circumstances, […] build a modern military force system with Chinese 
characteristics. We must deepen military structural and personnel 
allocation adjustment and reform, move adjustment and reform of 
military policies and institutions forward, and promote the integrated 
and deep development of the military and the people.”3 
Following which, in November 2015, at Central Military 
Commission’s Reform Work Conference, Xi expressed the intent to 
resolutely implement national defence and military reform as part of 
a comprehensive strategy to build a strong army and to unswervingly 
follow the path of building a strong military with Chinese characteristics.4 
To which, Xi outlined the targets as: to make breakthroughs in military 
administration and joint operational command; to optimise the military 
structure, enhance policy systems and civilian-military integration; to 
build a modern military with Chinese characteristics that can win digital 
wars and effectively fulfil its duties; and to perfect the military system 
with Chinese characteristics5—resulting into the “most wide-ranging and 
ambitious restructuring since 1949.”6
Underlying these targets, Xi’s four-point agenda under PLA’s 
reform called for: adjust China’s military leadership and command 
system, optimise structure and function, reform policies and systems 
and promote deeper civil-military integration.7 What is apparent is that 
seeking a ‘deeper civil-military integration’ is one of the key ambitions. 
Highlighting the ‘significance,’ Xi stated:























“Implementing the strategy of military-civilian integration is a 
prerequisite for building integrated national strategies and strategic 
capabilities and for realising the Party’s goal of building a strong military 
in the new era.”8
Here, the objective is to  promote military development through 
coordinated efforts in sci-tech innovation in key areas between the 
military and the civilian sector-with integrated and deep development 
of the military and the people acting as the bottom line of the MCF. 
Thereby, Xi’s addition of “military-civil integration” to the reform agenda 
has confirmed its significant role in PLA’s overall military modernisation 
and China’s larger national security imperative.
Xi’s Push Towards MCF
While under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the concept of ‘civil-military 
integration’ mainly centred on building China’s defence industrial base; 
the concept has significantly evolved under the successive leadership to 
include new elements such as military personnel education, logistics, and 
infrastructure planning and construction. Further expanding the scope, 
Xi identified new areas under MCF, that includes:9 infrastructure, national 
defence-related sci-tech industry, weapon and equipment procurement, 
talent cultivation, socialisation of the support system for the military, as 
well as the mobilisation for national defence for the integration of military 
and civilian industries.10 In view of this, in June 2017, Xi articulated the 
MCF strategy, by stating that:
“We must accelerate the formation of a full-element, multi-domain, 
and high-return military-civil fusion deep development pattern, and 
gradually build up China’s unified military-civil system of strategies and 
strategic capability.”11 
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China’s reforms have been a result of concerns over lack of resources 
and the need for defence modernisation. However, under Xi, the push 
forward is driven by the need to coordinate building of China’s economy 
and defence capabilities simultaneously. This is guided by the objective to 
balance development and security in the overall national strategy, wherein: 
“[d]eepening national defence and military reforms are [to be] in line with 
the requirements of the times to realise the Chinese dream of national 
rejuvenation and China’s strong-military dream.”12 In pursuit of which, 
Xi stressed that “the ideas, decisions and plans of military and civilian 
integration must be fully implemented in all fields of national economic 
development and defence building and in the whole processes.”13
Xi’s push forward in MCF is driven by the imminent need to 
modernise China’s defence science, technology, and indu trial base 
given the growing complexity in the security environment and the need 
for PLA to match the technological demands of fighting and winning 
“informationised local wars.” This is motivated by the desire to make 
the PLA well-versed in modern technology-driven warfare; wherein, 
the lessons learnt by the Chinese from the Gulf Wars and Kosovo Crisis 
emphasized on the decisive role played by technology in modern warfare 
and conflictscalling for the need to upgrade defence technology to 
match the pace of technological innovation. As the inability to match and 
adapt to the rapidly changing science and technology (S&T) capabilities 
will call for dire effects on a country’s national secur ty. Highlighting this 
trend at play, PRC’s 2015 Defence White Paper suggests:
“The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new 
stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons 
and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Outer space 
and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic 
competition among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its 
evolution to informationization.”14
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In this regard, artificial intelligence (AI) is seen critical to next 
generation warfare, as “War is evolving in form towards informationised 
warfare, and intelligent warfare is on the horizon.”15 With AI and other 
range of technologies such as autonomous systems driving the next RMA, 
MCF aims to pave the way for PLA to conduct “intelligent warfare.” 
Fundamentally, MCF offers to ease the PLA’s competition for resources 
by broadening and strengthening China’s defence industrial base by 
“leveraging of dual-use technologies, policies, and organisations for 
military benefit.”16 Mainly, with technology becoming increasingly ‘dual-
use;’ thus, blurring the divined between civil and military, it becomes 
imperative for China to promote MCF in technology sharing. 
This is also aided by the fact that the civilian sector is becoming a 
potent source of major technological innovation. For instance, as an 
analysis in Qiushi observed that “disruptive technological change in the 
21st century now usually starts in the civilian sector.”17 To cite a few 
examples, some private companies working with the PLA in supporting 
the MCF include: Yunzhou Tech, a leader in unmanned surface vessels; 
Ziyan, a major player in drones and unmanned helicopters; and Kuang-
Chi Technologies, which is applying machine learning to its research 
on military metamaterials amongst others.18 Similarly, in the field of AI, 
Tianjin’s new Artificial Intelligence Military-Civil Fusion Innovation 
Center was established in partnership with the Academy of Military 
Science; while Qingdao has specialised in undersea robotics systems 
and is actively exploring applications of AI for this domain.19 These 
advancements resonate Xi’s sentiments as expressed at the 19th Party 
Congress, stating: “We must keep it firm in our minds that technology is 
the core combat capability, encourage innovations in major technologies, 
and conduct innovations independently.”20 
Furthermore, the MCF is in line with PLA’s military preparedness, 
which aims at: first, to “win informationised local wars” (信息化條件下
的局部戰)—which is considered to be the most likely form of combat 
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the PLA will face in the future; second, to increase the PLA’s ability to 
carry out joint operations on a modern high-tech battlefield.21  Wherein, 
by adopting the MCF strategy, Xi seeks to sharpen PLA’s combat 
strength through technological innovation and strengthen Chinese-
developed innovations in defence technologies. Accordingly, the CPC is 
systematically reorganising the Chinese S&T enterprise to ensure that new 
innovations simultaneously advance economic and military development. 
As a result, the key technologies that China is targeting to excel under 
MCF includes quantum computing, big data, semiconductors, 5G, 
advanced nuclear technology, aerospace technology, and AI with the 
ultimate aim to exploit the inherent ‘dual-use’ nature of many of these 
technologies, which have both military and civilian applications. Arguably, 
the pressing concern balancing the imperative of economic development 
with increasing requirements for national defence has motivated Xi’s 
drive for MCF thus, enabling China to become both an economic and 
military superpower. 
The Concept of MCF in China’s National Strategy
In March 2015, Xi elevated MCF into a national strategy (ba junmin 
ronghe fazhan shangsheng wei guojia zhanlüe, 把军民融合发展上升为国
家 战略) by transitioning it from “early-state fusion” to “deep fusion”a 
“move to rejuvenate the nation and a strategy to strengthen the armed 
forces” (关乎国家安全和发展全局, 既是兴国之举, 又是 强军之策).22 
It is to note that it was former C inese President Hu Jintao in 2007, who 
was the first to lay the foundation of MCF in Chinese strategic thinking; 
wherein, at the 17th Party Congress, Hu urged the country to “take a 
path of military-civilian fusion with Chinese characteristics”—which was 
intensely pushed further by Xi Jinping.
PLA’s National Defense University (NDU) researchers interpret 
MCF, in the current form to be representing the basic (near-term) and 
ultimate (long-term) goals of the strategy. Wherein, the ‘near-term’ goal 
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of the strategy is to form the “military-civil fusion deep development 
pattern,” which comprises three core components: full-element, multi-
domain and high-return (see Figure 1).23 
Figure 1: Military-Civil Fusion Deep Development Pattern
     Source: Adapted from Stone and Wood (2020).24
Table 1: Domains Prioritised under Xi’s MCF Strategy
Six Traditional 
Domains













1. Maritime 1. Biotechnology
2. Manufacturing 2. Advanced Defence 
STI SoS with Chinese 
characteristics
2. Space 2. New Energy
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4. Education 4.Military Personnel 
Training SoS
5. Social Services 5. Socialised Support 




6. National Defence 
Mobilisation SoS
*The six SoS are related to the six “traditional domains” that are meant to gradually take shape 
through the promotion of MCF in these domain. 
Source: Prepared by the Author with reference to Stone and Wood (2020).25
The six SoS as noted above are formed by fusing civilian and defence 
ecosystems that possess high level of commonality, which were previously 
operating in silos. The domains as listed in Table 1 and the six SoS form 
the backbone of Xi’s MCF strategy, as noted in Table 2 that follows.
Table 2: The Military-Civil Fusion and the Creation of the Six SoS
Source: Adapted from Stone and Wood (2020).26
While the “ultimate goal” is to build “unified military-civil system 
of strategies and strategic capability”—weaving the components of the 
MCF strategy into other national strategic priorities to achieve an organic, 
powerful, and comprehensive national system of strategies (see Figure 2).27 
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Figure 2: China’s Unified Military-Civil System of Strategies and 
Strategic Capability
   Source: Adapted from Stone and Wood (2020).28
With primacy attached, the MCF was written in the China’s 13th Five-
Year Plan (FYP) for 2016-2020. While on 21 July 2016, the Opinion 
on the Integrated Development of Economic Construction and National 
Defense Construction (2016 Opinion) (关于经济建设和国防建设融合
发展的意见) was released by the CPC Central Committee, the State 
Council, and the Central Military Commission.29 Thereafter, MCF has 
become predominant in Chinese parlance, as highlighted in Figures 3 
and 4.
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Figure 3: Reference of CMI and MCF in China’s FYP (1991-2020)
Source: Adapted from Fritz (2019).30
Figure 4: Reference of CMI and MCF in Chinese Academic 
Publications (1991–2020)
Source: Adapted from Fritz (2019).31
As noted in Figure 3, CMI was first referred in 1991 and MCF made 
its first appearance under the 12th FYP with a significant spike under the 
13th FYP. As noted, 12th FYP had four references, while 13th FYP (2016–
20) referenced the MCF strategy ten times. It also represents the shift in 
China’s policy position from CMI to MCF. While Figure 4 highlights the 
increasing discussion of MCF in academic literature—indicative of the 
increasing civilian involvement in MCF—further clarifying the blurring 
divide between military and civil the very aim that China seeks to archive 
under MCF.
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In resonating the MCF strategy, the 2019 White Paper stated: 
“Building a fortified national defense and a strong military commensurate 
with the country’s international standing and its security and development 
interests is a strategic task for China’s socialist modernization” [emphasis 
added] calling for China to pursue innovation and accelerate military 
intelligentisation.32 Simplistically put, with this strategy, the private sector 
will be at the forefront to help modernise China’s defences and develop 
cutting-edge technologies—areas that were earlier exclusively under the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Given the rapid progress in MCF, it becomes imperative to understand 
the factors that called for Xi’s MCI reforms. As noted, Xi’s such a move 
came in response to his concerns over “problematic mindsets, tizhi33 
barriers, and vested interests” that have restricted the development of 
MCF in all these yearsas “integration is a problem that has yet to be 
resolved.”34 Prior to Xi, much of what China’s leadership promoted for 
CMI mainly pertained to basic reforms related to institutional behaviour 
such as: changes that allowed private companies to begin to contract 
goods and services to the PLA, or the effort to encourage joint research, 
technology transfer, and personnel training agreements between civil and 
military companies, universities, and research institutions—reorienting 
political, corporate, and military leaders toward collaborative development 
processes in which they had little to no experience.35 Given the complexity 
attached, China’s initial CMI reforms mainly focused on four high-
priority areas: weapons and equipment development, social support for 
the PLA, defence personnel training, and defence mobilisation36which 
under MCF, the focus areas have been broadened both in scope and scale.
The MCF is also a response to the changing security environment; 
wherein, China is confronted with “profound changes” in its national 
security environment and is “responding to the demands of the day for a 
strong country with a strong military.”37 In light of which, Yu Chuanxin, 
an expert from China’s Academy of Military Science argues that “the 
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complex and increasing security threats facing China from foreign and 
domestic enemies, its economy and society need a strong military that 
can ensure security, stability, and peace.”38 Owing to this perspective, 
the core objectives behind Xi’s MCF strategy are mainly three-fold:39 
First, building a strong national security state, especially prioritising 
the development of military, internal security, and information control 
capabilities across a wide array of domains, of which cyber is of central 
importance; second, building an advanced defence science, technological 
and industrial base; and third, forging a dual-use civil-military economy.40 
MCF encompasses six interrelated efforts:41 (1) fusing the China’s 
defence industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base; 
(2) integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations 
across military and civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending 
military and civilian expertise and knowledge; (4) building military 
requirements into civilian infrastructure and leveraging civilian 
construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service and 
logistics capabilities for military purposes; and, (6) expanding and 
deepening China’s national defence mobilisation system to include all 
relevant aspects of its society and economy for use in competition and 
war. This fusion suggests that the aim of MCF is to harness the capability 
of the civilian sectors, including science, and technology, to advance 
China’s military, economic, and technological prowess—making MCF 
an all-encompassing approach. 
To implement the MCF strategy, in January 2017, the Central 
Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development 
(zhongyang junmin ronghe fazhan weiyuanhui, 中央军民融合发展委
员) was set up, with Xi Jinping as the head. The Commission acts as 
the highest level “decision-making and coordination mechanism” for 
MCF development, and is instrumental in breaking down institutional 
barriers across the government, military, and industry that have hindered 
MCF implementation.42 In June 2017, at the first plenary meeting of 
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the Commission,43 Xi called for more efforts to boost joint military and 
civilian development in the fields of sea, outer space, cyber space, biology 
and new energy—further expanding the scope, the level and degree of 
integration wherever it applied. Xi also stressed that the integration must 
combine state guidance with the market’s role, and comprehensively 
employ institutional/organisational innovation,44 policy support and 
legal guarantee to give full play to military and civilian integration. In 
doing so, the MCF policy has called for China’s academic, corporate 
and research institutions to invent cutting-age technologies for building 
China’s military and national defence capabilities. 
MCF’s Significance for China Versus Rising Scepticism
In 2016, at the CPC’s Central Politburo meeting, that reviewed and 
passed the 2016 Opinion, Xi called the MCF strategy “a grand strategy 
that benefits the nation, the military, and the people” (一项利国利军
利民的大战略);45 however, there is yet no exact interpretation to Xi’s 
statement—thus, making it open ended. This very gap calls for suspicion 
over China’s intentions. Here, the query is: What does the PRC seeks to 
achieve by its MCF Strategy?
In providing some understanding of Xi’s intent, one of the 
interpretation suggests that MCF can benefit China in four ways:46 First, 
it can support China’s transformation into a powerful nation—wherein, 
defence construction can provide a boost to the slowed economic growth. 
Second, can help China gain advantages in international technological 
and military competitions by closing the technological gap with other 
major powers such as the United States and even surpass them in S&T 
development. Third, provides China with an excellent opportunity 
for the improvement of China’s governance system—integrating the 
military and civilian sectors and enabling the creation of a governing 
system across sectors, government bodies, and domains. Fourth, it 
supports the strategic goal of building a world-class military by gaining 
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strong economic strength, scientific and technological strength, and 
comprehensive national strength.47 
While some Chinese analysts argue CMF as a “strategic requirement” 
[zhanlüe xuqiu, 战略需求] and the only way to build a military capable 
of winning informationised wars.48 It is believed that MCF is essential to 
achieve optimised resource allocation for defence building and economic 
development by integrating the military and the civilian resources. As 
Chen Yushu and Li Shandong, researchers from China’s PLA NDU, in 
their book Building Wealthy Nation and Strong Military by Deepening 
Integrated Military and Civilian Development argue that:49 
“the MCF strategy will greatly enhance the comprehensive national 
strength of China and contribute to the endeavour of building a wealthy 
nation and a strong military; however, the military-civilian integration 
for the research and production of weaponry should be market-oriented 
and feature ‘openness, competition and sharing’.”50
In Tai Ming Cheung’s view, “military-civil fusion remains a top 
priority for the Xi regime, and perhaps even more so as China finds itself 
in an increasingly fierce and coupled techno-security competition with 
the US and its allies.”51 More importantly, MCF is a “central component 
in Xi’s grand vision and strategy of China’s long-term geostrategic and 
geo-economic development, and especially to his g als of becoming a 
leading global power by the mid-2030s.”52 While MCF surely is providing 
a boost to China’s military prowess, but is raising red alarms for others.
As already noted, Xi’s MCF strategy remain open ended to 
interpretation. Given no clarity and the constant changes to the concept, 
there is an increasing scepticism over the implications of the MCF for 
the world at large. Of all, America seems to be more wary of Beijing’s 
intentions, as the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated, “Even if 
the Chinese Communist Party gives assurances about your technology 
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being confined to peaceful uses, you should know there is enormous risk 
to America’s national security.”53 As Pompeo pointedly notes, MCF’s:
“goal is to ensure that the People’s Liberation Army has military 
dominance. And the PLA’s core mission is to sustain the Chinese 
Communist Party’s grip on power—that same Chinese Communist 
Party that has led China in an increasingly authoritarian direction and 
one that is increasingly repressive as well. It runs completely at odds 
with the tolerant views that are held here in this area and all across 
America.”54
America’s such an attitude is driven by the perception that PRC’s MCF 
constitutes “a major security challenge to us [United States], its neighbours, 
and any country with a stake in the open international order.”55 The 
concerns lies in the fact that MCF can “make any technology accessible 
to anyone under the PRC’s jurisdiction available to support the regime’s 
ambitions”while it “is in part about economic power, but it is also, 
quite centrally, about augmenting Beijing’s military power” [emphasis 
added].56
What is worrisome about MCF is that the full scope of China’s MCF 
strategy is much broader than simply being public-private partnerships. As 
noted by the Pentagon, some of China’s leading e-commerce companies 
are directly supporting the PLA by providing them with drones for 
logistics; while some Chinese s ipping companies are contributing to 
cross-sea transport drills, providing capabilities that could be leveraged 
for an amphibious landing on Taiwan or in the South China Sea57 thus, 
raising concerns over China’s intentions behind its MCF strategy.
What calls for severe scrutiny is that by its MCF strategy, China is 
encouraging civilian enterprises and companies to undertake classified 
research and get involved in weapons production. Given this approach, the 
CPC is accused of adopting unlawful measures to bolster its own military 
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capabilities. According to the US State Department, China is acquiring 
key technologies by means of: investment in private industries, talent 
recruitment programs, directing academic and research collaboration 
to military gain, forced technology transfer, intelligence gathering, and 
outright theft.58 
With no more barriers between civil and military, under MCF the 
Chinese civil sector has been enlisted directly into the country’s military 
industrial complex, which holds global ramifications. Given this dynamic, 
it is argued that the joint research institutions, academia, and private 
firms are all being exploited to build the PLA’s future military systems 
often without their knowledge or consent.59 Thus, making MCF another 
manifestation of the ‘China Challenge’.
Conclusion 
Xi Jinping’s push for ‘military-civil fusion’ is aimed to build China into 
an economic, technological and military superpower with MCF acting as 
the lynchpin to China’s strategic goal of becoming ‘world class military’ 
by 2049. While there is no clear direction on the way China is practising 
MCF, this has resulted into scrutiny over Chinese intentions. Owing to 
the scepticism, one cannot dismiss the competitive and security challenge 
that is posed by it. To which, one cannot ignore the risks posed by the 
MCF strategy, which is invariably linked to China’s geopolitical ambitions 
both to protect and advance Chinese interests. China’s expanded efforts 
under military-civil collaboration needs a close attention. Thus, with 
MCF, Xi’s quest lies in building a strong China with a strong PLA.
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